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Decided on April 20, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
905 Mother Gaston Corp., Petitioner,
against
Edmond More a/k/a ADMON MORE, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,
Respondents.
905 MOTHER GASTON CORP., Petitioner,
against
RALPH SPEARS, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, Respondents.

905 MOTHER GASTON CORP., Petitioner,
against
MELINDA GALARZA, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, Respondents.

905 MOTHER GASTON CORP., Petitioner,
against
MARIE LUBRUN, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE Respondents.

L & T Index No. 309566/21
Petitioner's attorneys:
Shiryak, Bowman, Anderson,
Gill & Kadochnikov LLP
8002 Kew Gardens Road
Suite 600 Kew Gardens, NY11415
dbowman@sbagk.com
Respondent's attorneys:
Zabokritsky Law Group, P.C.
6906 Myrtle Avenue, Suite 2
Ridgewood, NY 11385
fzabokrit@gmail.com
David A. Harris, J.
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of
respondent's motion to dismiss and for sanctions, listed by NYSCEF number:
309566/21, 309567/21 and 309568/21: 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21
309569/21: 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision and Order on this Motion is as follows:
On the court's own motion, the motions captioned above, pending in four proceedings,
are consolidated for purposes of disposition.
After the expiration on September 30, 2021 of four functionally identical documents
entitled Ninety (90) Day Notice to Occupant on Termination of Occupancy and Intention to
Recover Possession (Notices), petitioner commenced these summary proceedings seeking to
recover possession of apartments 1F (309566/21), 1R (309567/21), 2F (309568/21) and 2R
(309569/21) in the building located at 905 Mother Gaston Boulevard in Brooklyn (Building).
The proceedings seek possession, alleging that respondents remain in possession after the
termination of their month to month tenancies.
While no answer has been filed in any of the proceedings, a notice of appearance has
been filed by which counsel for respondents purports to appear in all four proceedings

Respondents have also, through their counsel, filed, in each proceeding, the instant
functionally identical motion to dismiss. The motion seeks dismissal pursuant to CPLR
3211(a)(5), 3211(a)(7) and CPLR 3211(a)(10), as well as the imposition of a sanction of costs
and attorney's fees on petitioner pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 1301.1.
The instant litigation is neither the first litigation between these parties pending in
Housing Court, nor the only litigation now pending. Four prior holdover proceedings were
commenced under index numbers 54575/20, 54576/20, 54577/20, and 54578/20 (Prior
Proceedings), and a trial held. That trial resulted in a decision and order dated May 26, 2016
— an apparent scrivener's error as the trial took place in 2021 (309566/21, 309567/21 and
309568/21 — NYSCEF No. 8; 309566/21 — NYSCEF No. 9) (Prior Decision). The Prior
Decision resulted in the dismissal of the Prior Proceedings. The proceedings against Spears,
Galarza, and Lubrun were dismissed when the court found that they were tenants rather than
licensees. The proceeding against More was dismissed because More was deceased, and the
proceeding was not brought naming an occupant or a representative of the estate. There also
remains pending in Supreme Court an asyet undecided suit to quiet title brought by 905
Mother Gaston LLC.
The three grounds respondents assert for dismissal are res judicata or collateral estoppel,
the failure to state a cause of action, and the failure to name a necessary party.
The "absence of a person who should be a party" (CPLR 3211 [a] [10]) can constitute a
basis for the dismissal of a proceeding. Here, respondents assert that 905 Mother Gaston LLC
is such an entity and that the "LLC who has ownership of the Mother Gaston property and
collect[s] money from the tenants clearly has interest in these holdover proceedings and is a
necessary party." Joinder, rather than dismissal, exists as a remedy and "[p]ersons who ought
to be parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action
shall be made plaintiffs or defendants" (CPLR 1001 [a]). Here, the entity that respondents
assert is a necessary party is 905 Mother Gaston LLC, the plaintiff in a pending suit to quiet
title.
Of course, such an action may be won or lost. As presently situated, 905 Mother Gaston
LLC does not have title to the Building. At trial any respondent may establish that there is no
landlordtenant relationship with petitioner, or that there is a landlord tenant relationship with
905 Mother Gaston LLC. That entity need not be a party for respondents to offer such
evidence, [*2]and respondents may, of course, call witnesses to testify as to the status of 905
Mother Gaston LLC. It need not be a party for any of this to occur.

While this court can determine whether petitioner is the owner or landlord, a
determination of the nature, if any, of 905 Mother Gaston LLC's interest in the Building, is
beyond the jurisdiction of this court; issues of title are not within the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court (Haque v Rob, 83 AD3d 895 [2d Dept 2011]).
Since 905 Mother Gaston LLC need not be a party in order for other respondents to
present their defenses, and there is nothing to indicate that 905 Mother Gaston LLC has an
interest in the Building that would be inequitably affected by the outcome of this litigation,
the branch of respondents' motion seeking dismissal for failure to name a necessary party is
denied.
Respondents further seek dismissal on the grounds of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, based upon the dismissal of the Prior Decision dismissing four earlier holdover
proceedings. Those proceedings were premised on the claim that respondents "entered into
possession of the subject premises without permission and are occupying the premises
without permission of the owner or prior owner." Such grounds plainly fall within the ambit
of RPAPL § 713, "grounds where no landlordtenant relationship exists." Ultimately, the
Prior Decision dismissed all four proceedings, three of them because "respondents are tenants
and not squatters." The fourth proceeding, against Admon More, was dismissed because "Mr.
More is deceased and no occupant or the estate has been joined." The dismissals, respondents
urge, bar the instant proceedings.
It has been held that:
"Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, "once a claim is
brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking
a different remedy" (O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d
687, 429 N.E.2d 1158; see Highlands Ctr., LLC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 149
AD3d 919, 921, 53 N.Y.S.3d 321). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, a
narrower species of res judicata, "precludes a party from relitigating in a
subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or
proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the
tribunals or causes of action are the same" (Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d
494, 500, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487; see Highlands Ctr., LLC v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 149 AD3d at 921, 53 N.Y.S.3d 321)."
(Jacob Marion, LLC v Jones, 168 AD3d 1043, 1044 [2d Dept 2019]). The commonality that
exists between the instant proceedings and those dismissed by the Prior Decision is that all of
the proceedings are brought under Article 7 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings

Law and involve the same parties. Beyond that visceral similarity, the proceedings
fundamentally differ. Unlike their predecessors, the instant proceedings recognize the
existence of a landlordtenant relationship and have been brought after the expiration of
notices seeking to terminate that relationship. Respondents appear to argue that the dismissal
of a holdover proceeding bars a further holdover proceeding, whatever the basis. The service
of proper predicate notice is an element of petitioner's prima facie case (433 West Assocs. v
Murdock, 276 AD2d 360 [1st Dept 2000]), and in commencing this proceeding, petitioner
served the required Notices, inconsistent with the claims of the proceedings dismissed by the
Prior Decision. The causes of action in the instant proceedings are distinct, brought pursuant
to RPAPL § 711, and petitioner is not [*3]precluded from maintaining these proceedings by
the dismissal of others. The branch of respondents' motion seeking dismissal on the grounds
of res judicata and collateral estoppel pursuant to CPLR 3211 [a] [5] is denied.
Petitioner's proceeding against More, however, raises a distinct, troubling issue. The
Prior Decision was abundantly clear and unequivocal. The proceeding against More was
dismissed because More was deceased and neither an occupant nor his estate, whether
through an executor or an administrator, had been named. The Prior Decision is silent as to
when More died, but from its terms it is evident that his demise occurred prior to
commencement of the proceeding.
Apparently undeterred by the dismissal or its basis, in October 2021, petitioner, through
its counsel, commenced the instant proceedings, which include a proceeding against the
deceased More. Petitioner further filed an affidavit of service upon the decedent,
documenting three unsuccessful attempts at service before resort to conspicuous posting.
Such service, of course, was doomed to failure as there is no living respondent who could be
served.
Several months later, the same counsel who appeared for respondents at the trial
resulting in the Prior Decision, appeared once again. Notwithstanding More's death, counsel
filed a notice of appearance in his behalf. Of course, More could not have retained counsel.
Apparently undisturbed by the lack of a client, counsel has made the instant motion not only
in those proceedings in which counsel has a client, but also in the proceeding brought against
the deceased More.
Inexplicably, counsel has submitted to this court both documentation indicating
representation of someone who was deceased long before such representation could have
commenced, and also a motion seeking affirmative relief on behalf of someone deceased

before the litigation commenced.
The court finds deeply problematic the cavalier approach taken to this litigation by
counsel for both parties. Petitioner's counsel was well aware that More was deceased but
elected to commence a proceeding against him. Petitioner even utilized a process server,
despite the unequivocal nullity that service upon a known decedent represents.
Respondent's counsel, equally aware that More is deceased, could have come before the
court as a friend of the court and imparted that information so that judicial resources would
not be expended on a nullity. Instead, despite the lack of any client or any authority to do so,
counsel elected to file not just a notice of appearance but a preanswer motion to dismiss on
behalf of the decedent.
Under the salient provisions of law, conduct:
"is frivolous if:
(1) It is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law
(22 NYCRR § 1301.1). Intentionally commencing litigation against someone known to be
deceased, particularly where prior litigation was dismissed because the person was deceased,
and going through the motions of attempting service upon the decedent, falls comfortably
within the ambit of the statute. The litigation was a nullity from the moment the petition was
filed, compounded by filing an affidavit of service and inexplicable opposition to a motion to
dismiss a proceeding that never should have been commenced against a decedent.
The conduct of respondents' counsel is similarly troubling, counsel having filed a notice
of appearance despite the impossibility of ever having been retained by a decedent. That
other living tenants of the Building may have retained counsel renders counsel's actions in
filing a notice of appearance on behalf of a deceased litigant no less inexcusable. The
inappropriate conduct is augmented by the fact that counsel, without a client to provide
assent or guidance, elected to make a motion to dismiss on behalf of the decedent.
Counsel for each party has engaged in frivolous conduct for the reasons set forth above.
Each is to pay a sanction in the sum of $750 to the Lawyers Fund for Client Protection, and
to file on NYSCEF proof of its payment no later than June 8, 2022 at 3:00 PM, when the
proceedings against Spears, Galarza and Lubrun will next appear on the court's calendar.
Respondents' counsel is to interpose answer within ten days.

For the same reasons stated in the Prior Decision, the proceeding brought against More,
under index number 309566/21 is dismissed; neither an executor nor an administrator nor an
occupant has been named.
This is the decision and order of the court.

Brooklyn, New York
April, 20, 2022
DAVID A. HARRIS, J.H.C.
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